Production economics literature contains many studies which assume that the producer's goal is to ma,cimize profits. This study tests the hypothesis that Bernoullian and le,cicographic utility are more accurate predictors of farmer behavior than profit maximization. Si,c large California farms were used to test the hypothesis. After-income ta,c E-V ( e,cpectation-variance) boundaries were developed for each farm and utility, and profit maximizing crop plans were determined for each. A goodness-of-fit criterion showed that Bernoullian utility formulations provided the greatest accuracy in predicting actual and planned crop patterns, followed by the lexicographic formulation. Profit maximization showed the poorest predictive power.
price) generaIIy show a much greater misallo cation of resources than is revealed by average resource use over the sample. As Massell and Johnson [ 15] emphasize, profit-maximizing re source use on the average farm is a necessary but not sufficient condition for profit-maximizing be havior on individual farms. Yet the latter is a necessary condition to achieve efficient resource allocation. In fact, empirical studies explicitly employing the profit maximization hypothesis (e.g., in linear programming studies of individual farm and aggregate supply ·response) have gen- erally provided results inconsistent with ob served or plausible behavior [ e.g., 1, 4] . Second, the typical production function study, with few exceptions, is based on a sample of firms whose output mix is fairly heterogeneous. It is the au thors' suspicion, to be explained subsequently, that the results in such cases are largely spurious. Third, the traditional production function ap proach takes prices and technology as given (risk less), and profit maximization as an appropriate expression of producer behavior. Dillon and An derson f 5) recently attempted to incorporate risk considerations ( technical uncertainty) into the appraisal of resource allocation efficiency through the estimation of "expected loss." They also emphasize the need for investigation of al ternative behavioral hypotheses, such as ex pected utility maximization.
The objective of this study is to provide a test of predicting individual producer behavior within a framework which corrects many of the defi ciencies noted above. Production functions are estimated for individual crops, rather than for a heterogeneous aggregate; technical and price risk for each crop are included; finally, the farmer's subjective attitude toward risk is approximated by utility functions estimated through personal interviews. The guiding hy pothesis is that inadequate treatment of risk has been a major factor accounting for the dis crepancy between actual and predicted (profit maximizing) individual behavior in past studies. Given the specific risk framework to be devel oped below, it is hypothesized that farmers' operational decisions are more consistent with utility maximization than with profit maximi zation. For comparison, three alternative de cision criteria are tested: profit maximization, maximization of Bernoullian utility, and maxi mization of utility in a lexicographic context.
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Utility vs. Profit Maximization
The basis for reservations about the aggregate production function approach and its disregard for risk is illustrated in Figure 1 . Suppose that firms in the sample can produce potatoes, corn, or wheat. Further, suppose that firm A special izes in potatoes (a), B in corn ( b), and C in wheat ( c) , and that each is produced with a technically efficient, fixed factor proportions pro duction function. 1 Converting the output of each firm to value by the normal production function aggregation procedure, firms A, B, and C all produce $10,000 worth of output with different factor proportions and fall nicely on isoquant abc. Suppose the input price ratio is given by line PP ( constant for all three firms). Then, firms A and C are judged to be "price inefficient" [7] , even though they are technically efficient.
Suppose now that another firm D is observed producing $10,000 of output with a combination of one-fourth potatoes and three-fourths wheat. Firm D is then judged to be technically ineffi cient-a strange result since both potatoes and wheat are produced individually in a technically efficient manner.
The "economic inefficiency" ( arising from technical inefficiency, price inefficiency, or both) of firms A, C, and D, according to production function studies may be due to the following: first, one factor of production fixed in the short run (e.g., if K is fixed at K 1 , firm C may be set ting MVP1 = P1 at point c), or second, be-1 In California attempts to fit Cobb-Douglas produc tion functions to samples of farms specializing in a single crop have failed because inputs were used in essentially fixed proportions. This limited range of input substitu tion in the production of a single product in a homoge neous region holds quite generally. cause each firm faces different factor prices ( e.g. a price line P'P' for firm A). Once "corrected':
for such variables, the behavior of the individual firms is said to be relatively well explained by the profit maximization assumption. However, the above rationalizations for firms A and C cannot be extended easily to firm D-the case of a multiple product firm. Interestingly, the published cases which show behavioral results significantly different from the profit-maximizing assumption frequently include multiple-product production functions. Now suppose that risk (measured in terms of the variance of crop net income) is highest for potatoes, moderate for corn, and lowest for wheat. Suppose further that the expected net incomes of the three enterprises rank in the same order-from a high for potatoes to a low for wheat (e.g., assuming price line PP'). Utilizing the E-V (expectation-variance) decision frame work, suppose that a, b, and call fall on a mean variance (E-V) boundary. 2 Even point d might fall on the E-V boundary somewhere between b and c. If so, all points observed are "efficient" in an E-V sense, and all producers could be "ra tional" in the sense that they maximize utility with different utility functions. For example, in Theoretically, utility maximization is more at tractive than profit maximization in that ( 1) it can explain why two individuals, faced with exactly the same situation, might rationally re spond quite differently, and (2) it does not exclude profit maximization but rather includes it as a special case of Bernoullian utility. Ten tative support for the utility maximization hy pothesis, based on a sample of Australian wool producers, was reported earlier in this Journal by Officer and Halter [ 16 J . The current study complements this earlier investigation by ex tending the analysis to a different set of pro ducers (large California farmers) and by ex amining lexicographic utility functions as well as Bernoullian utility functions and profit maxi mization. Lexicographic utility was included pri marily on the grounds that it can easily incor porate multiple goals, whereas Bernoullian utility concentrates only on attitudes toward risk.
Selection of Farms and Test Procedures
The authors reasoned that the utility hy pothesis could be subjected to a particularly rigorous test on large-scale California farms i.e., in situations where the profit· maximization hypothesis appeared a priori to be quite valid. Thus, six case study farms-three family part nerships varying from 2,200 to 3,000 irrigated acres and two corporations and a non-family partnership varying from 7,500 to 26,500 ir rigated acres-were selected for intensive anal ysis. All six farms were located in an area (Westside, San Joaquin Valley) where high water costs have forced a careful analysis of high-value, high-risk alternatives such as fruit, nut, grape, and vegetable production. All had ample access to capital so that risk preference rather than external capital rationing appeared predominant in crop selection decisions.
The procedure for testing the predictive power of utility maximization relative to profit maxi mization included four essential steps:
Derivation of the mean-variance (E-V)
frontier of cropping systems for each farm. 
Derivation of the E-V Frontiers
The E-V frontier for each farm shows a set of alternative production plans, each providing minimum net income variance for specified levels of expected net income. Empirically, the E-V frontier for each farm was efficiently derived using the following quadratic programming (QP) model: In the spirit of the Bayesian approach, the decision-maker's subjective probability distribu tions of price and yields were incorporated, inso far as possible, in the estimation of the expected net return vector ( C') and the variance covariance matrix of net returns ( 1/2Q). Sub-jective probabilities were used to simulate as closely as possible the decision-maker's view of his own individual decision environment and to avoid the downward aggregation bias caused by the use of county or state price and yield series to estimate individual farm variability [ 2] . In fact, when prices and yields were combined with cost data, the net income variances based on subjective probability (those used in this study) exceeded those estimated from aggregate time series data in 90 percent of the cases.
While the means and variances of net income for individual crops on each farm were estimated subjectively, it proved impossible to obtain sub jective estimates of covariances ( or correlations) directly from the farmers. Neither was it possible to use directly the historical covariances among crops since these, when combined with subjective variances, led to inconsistencies revealed by a variance-covariance matrix that was not positive semi-definite. Thus, to generate estimates of co variances, time series of net incomes for each crop were reconstructed by expressing the histori cal trend-corrected net incomes for each crop in terms of standard normal deviates about the mean, then substituting the standard deviations derived from the subjective net income distribu tions. Calculation of the variance-covariance matrix from this reconstructed set of time series data preserved the subjective net income vari ances, incorporated the historical relationships among crops, and guaranteed a positive semi definite matrix.
A quadratic programming (QP) model for each farm provided an estimate of the ("before tax") E-V boundary for that farm.
3 Moving up the E-V frontier, the cropping system changed from entirely field crops to ones dominated by trees, vines, and fresh vegetables. 4 Given the extremely 3 See Figure 3 for an example of the "before tax" E-V boundary. The E-V boundary solutions were ob tained on the IBM 1130 using a quadratic programming routine developed by Prof. James N·. Boles, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
4 Since trees and vines are perennial crops requiring a long-term investment, there is some question of whether they should be included in a model along with annual crops. In this study, the expectation (E) and variance ( V) of the annual annuity value of trees and vines were calculated and compared directly with annual crops. We recognize that this simplification ignores special problems such as heavy cash flow requirements, lack of flexibility once planted, and other factors beyond E and V which might influence decisions. To the extent that these other factors dominate, our results will be distorted.
Am. J. Agr. Econ. high levels of potential income, however, the realistic decision environment for producers clearly should include income taxes. Thus, the E-V curve for each farm was corrected to an "after tax" basis, utilizing the 1972 income tax regulations (progressive tax rate, income averag ing, loss-carry forward and backward, maximum tax on earned income, and capitalization of citrus and almond orchard development costs) .
While an "after tax" E-V boundary might conceivably be derived by explicitly introducing the various income tax regulations into a QP model, such a procedure would be almost hope lessly complicated. Thus, the "before tax" E-V boundary for each farm was converted to an "after tax" basis by a Monte Carlo simulation involving the following steps :
1. For a given E-V point on the "before tax" frontier, simulate n years (n = 30 to 120) of incomes with that E and V ( the greater the variance, the larger the required value of n) .
Apply the relevant income tax provisions
to that series, thereby deriving a new series of "after tax" incomes. 3. Calculate the "after tax" E and V from the new series, providing one point on the "after tax" E-V frontier. 4. Repeat steps l and 3 for a series of E-V points, tracing out the entire "after tax" E-V frontier.
As hypothesized, and as illustrated later for farm 1 in Figure 3 , inclusion of income taxes changed both the level and curvature of the E-V frontier. The "after tax" E-V frontiers were used exclusively in the tests of utility and profit maximization.
Derivation of Utility Functions
Bemoullian utility
The Ramsey model, modified somewhat as explained below from that used by Officer and Halter [ 16] Table 1 summarizes the general information on the six case study farms and shows the general form of Bernoullian utility function obtained for each. The specific Bernoullian utility func tions for the six case-study farms are shown in Table 2 . Two subjects ( farms 2 and 4) have con stant marginal utility functions, three (farms 1 , 3, and 6) have diminishing marginal utility (risk aversion) over the entire range, while one ( farm 5 ) has a range first of diminishing marginal utility followed by a range of increasing marginal utility ( risk preference) . Table 1 suggests no obvious direct relationship between the form of the utility function and the size or form of owner ship of the firm, although the number of observa tions is admittedly too small to allow conclusions to be drawn. According to this specification, farm 1 seeks to 7 The goals of these decision-makers are slightly more "business oriented" than the goal orientation of farm families reported in previous studies, which included living standard, farm ownership, leisure-family relation ships, and credit-using, risk-taking behavior [ 14, 17) . Limitation of the particular goals only to "business" objectives may have contributed to the poor predictive power of the lexicographic model.
I LIN, DEAN, AND Moou
Am. J. Agr. Econ. • U = utility value ; JI :: monetary value (measured in $1,000). Figures in parentheses a.re t-values. maximize the increase in net worth (WW) subject to satisfactory constraints on farm sur vival (s* ) , profit (tr*) , and-consumption ( C*) . However, since maximizing the increase in net worth (aNW) with consumption held at level C* requires maximizing '1'f (because of the ac counting relation aNW = 1r -C), the goal structure reduces to maximizing profit subject to the firm survival goal ; i.e., max E('Tt) , s.t. Prob (1t � -$100,000) � 0.90. Farms 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have goal structures which reduce to similar formulations (see Table  1 ) . Farm 2 , however, presents a case in which the survival goal is the least important and must be optimized with respect to satisfactory levels of the other three goals. Using the accounting equation (aNW = 1r -C) , satisfactory levels of the other three goals imply a minimum ex pected profit ;:;::: $130,000. Thus the goal struc ture of farm 2 reduces to one of minimizing the probability of a loss greater than -$150,000 subject to an expected income ;:;::: $130,000 ; i.e., min Prob ('IT � -$1 50,000) s.t. E('IT) � $130,000. 8
To close this section, it may be of interest to discuss briefly the problems encountered in de riving utility functions in the field. The authors met with each farmer several times to obtain technical data, required of any farm manage ment study, and to derive his subjective proba bilities of crop yields and prices, as well as to estimate his utility function. The latter required two sessions of one to two hours each. In con-8 The lexicographic formulations for farms 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are similar to the "safety-first'"'criterion of Telser [20] , while farm 2 is more closely related to the "disaster" level criteria proposed by Kataoka [ 1 1 ] and Roy [ 18) .
trast with earlier studies [e.g., 1 6] , this set of decision makers had little difficulty thinking in terms of the probabilities necessary to complete the utility "games." Surprisingly, they seemed to have greater hesitancy and lack of confidence in specifying the "disaster" and "satisfactory" income levels required for the lexicographic formulation. Another practical matter is whether the manager's utility function accurately reflects corporate (Board of Directors) goals (farms 4, 5). Experience with farm corporations indi cates that the manager generally has a dominant influence on the sub-set of decisions regarding annual cropping patterns. However, the appro priate method of deriving a corporate utility function for a broader range of decisions seems still to be an open question, including the con straints imposed by lending institutions.
Tests of Utility and Profit Maximization Hypotheses
Each of the three alternative behavioral hy potheses (Bernoullian utility maximization, lex icographic utility maximization, and profit maxi mization) can now be used to derive the optimum plan along the "after tax" E-V frontier. Figure   3 illustrates the procedure for farm 1. The Ber noullian utility function for farmer 1 implies an indifference map with constant utility curves of the shape shown. Point B 1 ( cropping plan 8) on the "after tax" E-V frontier provides maxi mum Bernoullian utility, u = 81. 9 The lexicographic utility function specified by 9 The utility maximizing plan "after taxes" (point B 1 , crop plan 8) predicts a more risky cropping system than "before taxes" (point B1, crop plan 3 ) , giving sup port to the idea that the complex of tax laws may in duce more risk-taking behavior.
farmer 1 was to maximize expected income sub ject to Prob (7T � -$100,000) � 0.90. The curve at the bottom of Figure 3 shows the income at the lower 10 percent point of the income distribution for each of the "after tax" E-V points. Thus, although plans 3 through 12 all respect the "satisfactory" level of the risk con straint, plan 12 (point L 1 ) is optimal because it has the highest expected net income value of this set. ( Plan 13 has a higher expected net  income value, but violates the risk constraint.) The profit-maximizing h yp othesis in a risk framework is typically specified as one of maxi mizing expected profit. This objective function effectively ignores risk, implying a linear Ber noullian utility function and indifference curves in the E-V space which are linear, parallel verti cal lines. Thus, expected profit maximization leads to selection of the point farthest to the right along the E-V frontier (point P1 in Figure  3 ).
Test I : Prediction of actual behavior
The components are now available for tests of the explanatory and predictive power of the three alternative behavioral hypotheses. Test 1 compares the ability of the three h yp otheses to explain actual behavior (i.e., the actual farm plan in 1972). Obviously, an "actual" farm plan has many dimensions-acreages of various crops, average income, input levels, etc. However, the best single characterization of a farm plan is perhaps its income distribution, i.e., the E and V associated with the plan (assuming normality, as appears reasonable in our case). Thus, com parisons of predictions with actual plans are made within the E-V space. Figure 4 shows the plans predicted by Ber noullian utility ( B ) , lexicographic utility ( L) , and expected profit maximization (P) compared with the actual plan (A) for each farm. (Dis regard the D, points for the moment.) Visual inspection suggests that Bernoullian utility pre dicts "best" in three cases ( farms 1, 3, and 6) , lexicographic utility predicts "best" in two cases (farms 2 and 5), and profit maximization pre dicts best in none of the cases. (All three hy potheses predict equally poorly for farm 4).
A more rigorous comparison was provided by using the chi-square goodness-of-fit test to de termine whether the income distribution from each predicted plan differed significantly from the actual plan. More precisely, the chi-square value can be used to calculate the probability of 1 , 2, 3, and 6 show a non-zero probability that the predicted distribution equals the actual dis tribution.
While this limited test should be expanded to include more farms and years, it is tentatively concluded that the Bernoullian and lexicographic utility predict actual behavior more accurately than expected profit maximization, with an ad vantage to the former. Most striking, perhaps is the poor predictive power of the classical behav ioral assumption of expected profit maximiza tion-the probability of a "correct" prediction from this assumption was essentially zero in all six cases.
Test 2: Prediction of "preferred" ( direct choice ) behavior
A troublesome feature of the above test was the tendency for most of the behavioral hy potheses to "overpredict" actual behavior, i.e., to predict higher risk plans than were actually followed in 1972. The implicit assumption in the test was that the actual plan accurately re flected the true preferences of the decision-maker. This assumption could have been invalid for a number of reasons. First, because of restrictions of which the authors were unaware, the decision makers might have been unable in 1972 to adjust their actual plans toward their preferred plans for the long run. Second, the decision-maker might simply have made an error in selecting a plan which he thought matched his preferences. Third, his preferences could have changed. For these reasons, a second test was proposed in which the predictions of utility and profit maxi mization were compared with the farm plan along the E-V frontier selected directly by the decision-maker. That is, the decision-maker was shown the E-V frontier (suitably presented in discrete tabular form based on the mean and standard deviation of each plan) and asked to select directly that plan he would prefer. The assumption in this case was that the plan se lected directly by the producer rather than the actual plan reflected his true preferences. Table 4 . Again, Bernoullian utility performs more consistently overall than either lexicographic utility or profit maximization. Ber noullian utility predicts direct choice behavior as accurately or more accurately than profit maximization in five of six cases. Lexicographic utility performed rather erratically-in com parison with profit maximization it "won" twice, "lost" twice, and "tied" twice. The profit maxi mization hypothesis predicted correctly three times but with large errors three times. Further, the "correct" predictions were for cases in which the Bernoullian utility function also predicted correctly, thereby providing empirical support for the theoretical argument that expected profit maximization can be treated as a special case ( constant marginal utility) or Bernoullian utility.
Visual inspection of Fi
Conclusions
The current study supports the conclusion of Officer and Halter [ 16] that Bernoullian utility maximization explains actual farmer behavior more accurately than profit maximization (cost minimization). Lexicographic utility functions, on the other hand, although apparently related more closely to the actual decision processes of farmers, performed poorly-only slightly better than profit maximization-in predicting actual and planned decisions.
None of the models predicted actual behavior well, with a strong tendency for all models to predict more risky behavior than was in fact observed. Profit maximization was the worst offender in this regard, consistently predicting cropping plans far more risky than those actually followed. This may explain why standard linear programming (LP) results are often disregarded by farmers as "unrealistic" and why aggregation of individual farm LP studies to predict industry behavior (e.g., supply functions) usually have overestimated actual responses. On the basis of 
